Debunking Claims: Russian Su-35 vs U.S. F-16V Radar Capabilities

Debunking Claims: Russian Su-35 vs U.S. F-16V Radar Capabilities

Introduction

Claims that the Russian Su-35's radar can blind the smaller nose cone of the U.S. F-16V have been widely debunked. This article will dissect the inaccuracies and explore the real differences in radar performance and electronic warfare capabilities between these two fighter jets.

Radar Beam Steering and Electronic Warfare

The electronic beam steering (EBS) capability of advanced radars like the AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) in the F-16V allows for fast and precise beam direction. While the smaller nose cone of the F-16V can restrict the physical movement of the radar antenna, leading to limited scanning range and flexibility, this does not equate to a blind spot. In fact, the F-16V's AESA radar relies on multiple transmit/receive modules that can be tightly packed, ensuring high-resolution imaging and effective target detection. Conversely, the smaller nose cone in the F-16V makes it difficult to deploy a sufficient number of these modules, thereby compromising the radar's performance.

AESA vs PESA Radar Performance

Contrary to claims, the Russian Su-35 with its Irbis-E radar is not superior to the F-16V's APG-83 AESA radar. The Irbis-E, designed for PESA (Passive Electronically Scanned Array) technology, has limited bandwidth, which negatively impacts its SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) resolution. In a recent flight test, the Irbis-E was able to track a single target at 100 km despite detecting it from 268 km, highlighting its limited engagement envelope. Additionally, despite the Irbis-E's supposedly excellent performance, it has proven ineffective against Ukraine's outdated SAM systems, which the Russians knew intimately.

Electronic Warfare and Jamming Capabilities

The effectiveness of electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, such as radar jamming, is a critical factor in air combat. The Su-35's EW suite, including the Khibiny-M jamming pods, has not proven to be highly effective in real-world scenarios. In Ukraine, numerous Su-35s, Su-30SMs, and Su-34s have been lost, primarily to Ukraine's 30-40 year-old SAM systems. This paints a grim picture of the Irbis-E's capabilities against modern AESA radars like the APG-83. Far from being a powerful jammer, the Irbis-E is notably limited in both bandwidth and SAR resolution, making it ineffective in a modern EW environment.

Conclusion

The claims that the Su-35's Irbis-E radar can blind the F-16V's APG-83 are baseless. In reality, the AESA technology in the F-16V provides superior performance, enhanced resolution, and better electronic warfare capabilities. The Su-35, despite its significant radar and electronic warfare systems, has not demonstrated the effectiveness to outperform the U.S. F-16V in real-world scenarios. It is crucial to base assertions on empirical data and realistic combat assessments rather than theoretical claims.